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TWOMBLY, THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS
EDWARD D. CAVANAGHt
INTRODUCTION
In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act,'
authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate uniform rules
governing practice and procedure in the federal courts. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were thereafter enacted and
took effect in 1938.2 A hallmark of the Federal Rules was a
liberalization of pleading standards. 3 The drafters rejected both
the common law model, which required that pleadings sound in a
cognizable legal theory of recovery, and pleading rules under the
various procedural codes enacted by state legislatures, which
generally required a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish
a cause of action. 4
Rather, the Federal Rules adopted a practice of notice
pleading. 5  Rule 8(a)(2) simply requires "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."6  The goal of notice pleading was to assure that
meritorious claimants got their day in court and that claims
would not be dismissed because they were inartfully drafted or
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; A.B. 1971, University of
Notre Dame; J.D. 1974, Cornell Law School; L.L.M. 1986, Columbia University
School of Law.
1 Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)).
2 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 334 (6th ed. 2004).
3 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 68, at 470-80 (6th ed. 2002).
4 See id. at 470-72.
5 See id. Professor Wright notes that the drafters of the Federal Rules eschewed
the label "notice pleading," fearing that use of such terminology might suggest the
absence of any standards. He argues that the Federal Rules "contemplate the
statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the claim
presented, even that it permits these circumstances to be stated with great
generality." Id. at 475.
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
because the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint did not
have in hand all facts necessary to prove a cause of action at
trial.7 Construing Rule 8(a)(2), nearly two decades after the
Rules had been issued, the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson8
established the legal standard governing the adequacy of a
complaint challenged on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
ruling that a complaint may not be dismissed at the pleading
stage "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."9
While Conley has not been without its detractors, 10 the
Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the Conley holding11
and, more importantly, rejected any attempts to create judge-
made rules of particularity in pleading, ruling that such matters
were for the rulemakers-not the courts.1 2 In the spring of 2007,
however, the Supreme Court changed its tune dramatically. In
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,' 3 the High Court, reversing the
Second Circuit, held that a complaint that alleges mere parallel
behavior among rival telecommunications companies, coupled
with stray statements of agreement that amounted to legal
conclusions failed, as a matter of law, to state a claim for an
antitrust conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.14 The Court ruled that in order to withstand a motion to
dismiss, an antitrust conspiracy complaint must plead "enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an [unlawful]
7 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 3, § 68, at 470-80.
8 355 U.S. 41 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007).
9 Id. at 45-46.
10 See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.
1984); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1665, 1685 (1998) ("Conley v. Gibson turned Rule 8 on its head .... ).
11 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1978 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If Conley's 'no set
of facts' language is to be interred, let it not be without a eulogy. That exact
language, which the majority says has 'puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years,' has
been cited as authority in a dozen opinions of this Court and four separate writings.
In not one of those 16 opinions was the language 'questioned,' 'criticized,' or
'explained away.' Indeed, today's opinion is the first by any Member of this Court to
express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation." (citation omitted)
(footnote omitted)).
12 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
13 127 S. Ct. 1955.
14 See id. at 1970-71.
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agreement was made." 15  The Court also emphasized that
plaintiffs need not set forth detailed factual allegations, but at
the same time that "grounds [showing] entitle[ment] to relief
require[ more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."'
16
Rather, a complaint must contain "plausible grounds [from
which] to infer an agreement" and allege "enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement." 17  The Court expressly "retired" Conley v.
Gibson and, in so doing, put an end to notice pleading as it has
been understood in the seventy years since the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 8
This Article analyzes the rationale for the Twombly holding
and concludes that: (1) the Court's assertion that judges cannot
effectively control litigation costs because the parties-not the
courts-control claims and defenses as well as the nature and
amount of discovery in any given case is contrary to fact; and
(2) certain classes of cases may well warrant particularized
pleading but that decision should be made by the rulemakers
through amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
not by judges on an ad hoc basis.
I. TWOMBLY
Twombly arose in the wake of the 1982 break up of AT&T as
a result of a consent decree settling a civil antitrust suit
commenced by the United States nearly a decade earlier. 19 For
much of the twentieth century, AT&T dominated both local and
long distance telephone services, as well as the markets for
telephone equipment and research. In 1974, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice filed a monopolization suit
seeking to break up AT&T. 20 After nearly eight years of pretrial
wrangling, AT&T agreed to enter into a consent decree in 1982.21
As part of that consent decree, AT&T agreed to divest ownership
15 Id. at 1965.
16 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1969.
19 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
20 Id. at 139.
21 Id. at 135, 139-40.
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of local telephone companies. 22 The consent decree established a
system of seven regional Bell operating companies, which were
granted monopolies in providing local phone services. 23 The
consent decree also created a competitive long distance market
from which the newly established regional operators were
excluded.24
A decade later, however, Congress enacted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,25 which fundamentally
restructured the market for local phone service by ending the
regional monopolies held by each of the regional operating
companies. In an effort to stimulate competition in local
markets, the Telecommunications Act permitted each of the
regional companies to compete in each others' markets and
required each of the regional companies to share its technology
with companies seeking to enter the new competitive local
markets for telephone services. 26  In the years immediately
following the enactment of the Telecommunications Act, the
regional operating companies, referred to as Incumbent Local
Exchanges Carriers ("ILECs") by the Court in Twombly, were
slow to comply with the mandates of the Telecommunications
Act.27 These delaying tactics did not escape the notice of federal
and state regulators. Bell Atlantic entered into a consent decree
with the FCC under which it made a "voluntary contribution" of
$3 million and was fined $10 million by the New York Public
Service Commission for its failure to make its facilities available
to AT&T.2 8
Twombly, a consumer of local phone and high speed internet
services, brought a putative class action against the ILECs
alleging that the ILECs (1) had conspired to inhibit the growth of
rival local service providers in their respective territories by,
among other things, limiting access to their networks,
overbilling, and sabotaging rivals' relationships with their
22 Id. at 141.
23 Id. at 160.
24 Id. at 186-89.
25 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
26 Id. at 61-63, 77-78; see also Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467,
475-76 (2002).
27 See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398, 403-04 (2004).
28 Id.
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customers; and (2) had agreed among themselves not to compete
with each other in their respective service areas. 29 The complaint
made no specific factual allegations of agreement among the
defendants; 30 it simply alleged the parallel course of conduct by
the ILECs, and characterized this conduct as a conspiracy in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.31
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, contending that
proof of conscious parallelism, without more, is insufficient as a
matter of law to establish an antitrust conspiracy. 32 Defendants
further argued plaintiff would have to adduce additional evidence
beyond parallel conduct-so-called plus factors-in order to
succeed at trial and its failure to allege plus factors in the
complaint was fatal to its claim.33 The trial court granted the
motion, 34 but the Second Circuit reversed. 35
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and ordered
that the complaint be dismissed. 36 The Court acknowledged that
while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eased pleading
requirements that had been in effect at common law and under
the Codes, it would be a mistake to suggest "that the Federal
Rules somehow dispensed with the pleading of facts altogether. 37
Rather, the Federal Rules merely relieve the plaintiff of the need
to "set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim."
3 8
29 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962 (2007).
30 Id.
31 Id. The complaint alleged:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in one
another's markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each
engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs within their respective local
telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and the other facts
and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information
and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a contract, combination or
conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone
and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to
compete with one another and otherwise allocated customers and markets
to one another.
Id. at 1962-63 (quoting Complaint 51).
32 Id. at 1963.
33 Id.
34 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated,
425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
35 425 F.3d at 102.
36 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
37 Id. at 1965 n.3.
38 Id.
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The Court further reasoned that factual allegations are critical to
a plaintiffs claim. 39
To make a "showing" that he is "entitled" to relief, a pleader
must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."40
Courts are not "bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation." 41 Allegations of fact "must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."42 A
pleading must contain more than facts "that merely create[] a
suspicion [ofl a legally cognizable right of action."43  It must
contain "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement."44
Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set
forth facts "plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)
agreement. '45 An allegation of conscious parallelism without
more "stays in neutral territory. 46
II. ANALYSIS
Much of the post-Twombly conversation has focused on the
meaning of "plausible" in the context of surviving a motion to
dismiss and whether the Twombly holding should be read
broadly to apply to all federal cases or narrowly to apply only to
complex cases. 47 Lost in that conversation is perhaps an even
more significant aspect of the Twombly decision-the Court's
conclusion that there is little that a judge can do to contain
pretrial costs in a federal action and that therefore dismissing
claims that from the pleadings appear to be insubstantial is the
only effective vehicle for controlling litigation costs. 48 For that
insight, the Court relies on a 1989 law review article by Judge
Frank Easterbrook that characterizes trial judges as helpless in
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1965.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1966.
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 153-59 (2d Cir. 2007) (suggesting a
case-by-case analysis), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3499 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2008)
(No. 07-1150).
48 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967.
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two respects: (1) the parties control the claims and defenses
asserted in the pleadings; and (2) the parties-not the courts-
control discovery. 49
At the time Judge Easterbrook made those observations,
issues regarding discovery costs, discovery abuse, litigation
delays, and the role of the judge in case management and in
settlement were hot topics of debate. An in-depth study of
discovery practices by then Professor, now Magistrate Judge
Wayne Brazil, had concluded, a decade earlier, that discovery
abuse was a significant problem in complex federal litigation, but
not in most kinds of federal cases.50 Nevertheless, little had been
done to address that concern. In 1989, the Brookings Institution
issued an expansive report critical of the manner in which
federal litigation was being conducted, noting in particular that
the process was laden with unnecessary costs and delays. 51 That
study led Senator Joe Biden to propose reform legislation, which
was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush as the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA").5 2 The Brookings study also
led President Bush to create the Quayle Commission, chaired by
then Vice President Dan Quayle, to study ways in which to
reform litigation practices by federal agencies. 53 The report of
the Quayle Commission led to the implementation of a series of
reform designed to reduce costs and delays in litigation by federal
agencies. 54
Most importantly, the Brookings study and enactment of the
CJRA galvanized the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules
into action. For years prior to the Brookings study and
enactment of the CJRA, the Advisory Committee had steadfastly
resisted calls for limitations on the scope of discovery and
numerical limitations on the use of discovery tools in a given
litigation, notably on the number of interrogatories and
49 Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989).
50 Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad Are the Problems?, 67 A.B.A. J.
450, 450 (1981); Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its
Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787,
790, 792 (1980).
51 See BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL:
REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989).
52 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000)).
53 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA (1991).
54 See id. at 7-27.
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depositions. On the other hand, in the 1983 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory Committee had
both empowered and encouraged federal judges to take a more
hands-on role in managing their dockets. The centerpiece of the
1983 Amendments was a rewritten and reformed Rule 16. 55
Judges were invited to use pretrial conferences as vehicles for
managing the entire pretrial process and not simply as the
means of planning the conduct of the trial.56 Thus, for example,
pretrial conferences could be used to resolve discovery disputes, 57
to dismiss sua sponte insubstantial claims or defenses, 58 or to
promote settlement efforts. 59 In addition, the 1983 Amendment
to Rule 11 mandated imposition of sanctions for assertion of
baseless claims or defenses. 60 Similarly, Rule 26 as amended
mandated sanctions when discovery sought was disproportional
to the needs of the case.61 The unifying themes of the 1983
Amendments were more active case management by judges and
imposition of sanctions for transgression of Rules 11, 16 and 26.62
These measures, however, did not silence criticism of the
federal civil justice system, and, pushed by Congress and the
Brookings report, the Advisory Committee revisited issues of
pretrial discovery and judicial management of litigation. That
revisitation led directly to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal
Rules. For the first time since the promulgation of the Federal
Rules in 1938, the Advisory Committee made comprehensive
changes with respect to the timing, amount and process of
discovery.
First, the 1993 Amendments imposed presumptive limits on
the number of depositions 63 and interrogatories in a given case.64
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983) (amended 2007).
56 See, e.g., id. 16(a)(2) (authorizing the judge to conduct a pretrial conference
for the purpose of "establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not
be protracted because of lack of management").
57 See id. 16(c)(9).
58 See id. 16(c)(1).
59 See id. 16(c)(7).
60 Id. 11 (1983) (amended 2007).
61 See id. 26.
62 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Frivolous Litigation: Developing Standards Under
Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499,
511 (1986).
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (1993) (amended 2007).
64 Id. 33(a) (1993) (amended 2007).
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Depositions were presumptively limited to ten per side65 and
interrogatories were limited to twenty-five per party. 66 The
parties, subject to court approval, could choose a different limit or
no limit; and the court itself, absent action by the parties, could
impose its own limits. 67 Imposition of numerical limits made it
clear-if it was not clear before-that parties were not entitled to
discovery that leaves no stone unturned. The 1993 Amendments
thus recognized inherent limits on discovery based on the needs
of the particular case. Ultimately, the nature of the discovery
limitations would be determined or at least approved by the
judges assigned to the case. Put another way, the parties were
no longer in control of discovery.
Second, the 1993 Amendments required that the parties
meet and confer prior to the initial pretrial conference to
formulate a joint discovery plan for presentation to the judge, for
approval at the first pretrial conference. 68 This process would
force parties to think about discovery systematically, rather than
in an ad hoc manner. By approaching discovery systematically,
the parties could more effectively determine their needs on
discovery and better estimate the overall cost of discovery.
Moreover, because the discovery plan had to be approved by the
judge, the parties would have significant incentives to formulate
plans that were reasonable. If nothing else, the joint plan
requirement forced counsel for the parties to communicate and,
hopefully, create an atmosphere conducive to cooperation.
Third, the 1993 Amendments barred any discovery until
after the discovery plan had been approved by the assigned
judge.69 Prior to 1993, the discovery process had all of the
organization of an Oklahoma land rush. Interrogatories and
deposition notices could be, and frequently were, served with the
complaint, to the obvious advantage of the plaintiff. Parties were
free to pursue discovery in any order once the complaint had
been filed. The 1993 Amendments leveled the playing field and
encouraged the parties to develop plans that reasonably
sequenced discovery.
65 Id. 30(a)(2)(A).
66 Id. 33(a).
67 See, e.g., id. 30(a)(2)(A).
68 Id. 26(f).
69 Id.
2008]
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Fourth, the 1993 Amendments introduced the concept of
mandatory automatic disclosure into the pretrial discovery
process. 70  Mandatory automatic disclosure required the parties
to turn over certain core information, such as the names of
witnesses, documents upon which the parties rely, and damage
calculations, without being asked.71  The concept underlying
mandatory automatic disclosure was that these materials were
integral to the lawsuit and would be requested on discovery in
any event.72 It therefore made sense from a cost standpoint to
require the information to be exchanged without a prior request
by the other side. 73 Once those initial disclosures had been made,
it would be easier to determine what additional materials would
be needed on discovery. 74 Unlike the other reforms introduced
under the 1993 Amendments, mandatory automatic disclosure
encountered significant opposition and criticism. 75 As pointed
out below,76 the concept never fulfilled its potential, in part
because few lawyers were willing to give it a fair test in the
marketplace and in part because it was simply too idealistic an
approach in the hardscrabble world of federal litigation.
The advisory committee continued efforts to fine-tune
discovery rules throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century.
70 Id. 26(a)(1).
71 For a detailed discussion of mandatory automatic disclosure, see Edward D.
Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systematic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts Be
Remedied by Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 721, 738-45 (1993).
72 See id. at 740.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 Compare George F. Hritz, Plan Will Increase Cost, Delay Outcomes, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 13, 1993, at 2, 2 (predicting that automatic disclosure will prove costly and
inefficient), Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush To
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 39-48 (1992) (positing that mandatory disclosure will
increase motion practice and overproduce documents of little relevance, thereby
increasing litigation costs), Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers
Should Be Litigators, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15 (commenting that mandatory
disclosure impinges on work product and attorney-client protections), and Linda S.
Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 820-21 (1991) (questioning the viability of
mandatory disclosure) with Charles P. Sifton, Experiment a Bold and Thoughtful
Step, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1993 at 2 (noting that automatic disclosure in most cases
will make civil discovery less adversarial), and Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of
Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 276 (1992) (arguing that mandatory
disclosure amendments to Rule 26 will reduce costs and delay).
76 See, e.g., infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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In 2000, it promulgated a rule further presumptively limiting
each deposition pursuant to Rule 30 to one seven-hour day. 77 At
the same time, the Committee amended Rule 26(b)(1) to limit the
scope of attorney-initiated discovery to matters relevant to a
"claim or defense."78 The 2000 Amendments also specified that a
party who finds discovery of matters relevant to claims and
defenses inadequate may move the court to obtain additional
discovery of information relevant to the "subject matter" of the
action. 79 Accordingly, the Rules have not abandoned entirely the
pre-2000 standard governing the scope of discovery. Rather, the
2000 Amendments provide that additional discovery under the
broader "subject matter" criteria may be obtained only with the
court's permission.
Perhaps the most striking oversight by the Court, however,
is its refusal to acknowledge the 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules on e-discovery which provide federal judges ample
authority to rein in potentially expensive e-discovery.80 It goes
without saying that issues with respect to e-discovery were
virtually unknown at the time of Judge Easterbrook's 1989
article. Equally important, the Court takes no notice of the
success district court judges have experienced in controlling costs
of e-discovery, notably Judge Scheindlin's Herculean efforts in
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, which has become a template for
judicial management of e-discovery issues.81 Thus, contrary to
the views expressed by the Court in Twombly, the Federal Rules
themselves now provide for significant judicial controls of
discovery and those controls appear to be working. Finally
recognizing that the provisions of the 1993 Amendments
establishing mandatory automatic disclosure had not had the
desired results, the Committee scaled back mandatory automatic
disclosure to require that parties disclose only those materials
that support a party's claims or defenses, rather than force
disclosure of materials that might support the other side's claims
or defenses.8 2
77 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1).
78 Id. 26(b)(1).
79 Id. (emphasis omitted).
80 Id. 34(a).
81 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
20081
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The implementation of the 1993 and 2000 Amendments to
the Federal Rules contradict the major premise of the Twombly
decision that the parties-not the courts-control the claims and
defenses asserted in an action, as well as the kind and amount of
discovery. Clearly, the courts have the power to eliminate
insubstantial claims or defenses early on in a lawsuit. Moreover,
it is simply inaccurate to say in 2007 that the parties in federal
actions control the nature and amount of discovery. Now the
court is in charge from the moment of the first pretrial
conference. The initial discovery plan proposed by the parties is
subject to judicial approval. Interrogatories and depositions are
subject to presumptive numerical limits that can be modified by
court order. All discovery vehicles are subject to the overall
limitation of proportionality, ultimately determined by the court.
Indeed, without judicial oversight, the limitations on discovery
would be meaningless.
Discovery reform, however, is not the only aspect of modern
federal civil litigation overlooked by the Court in Twombly. The
Court also failed to recognize or even mention case management
techniques advocated in the Manual for Complex Litigation.8 3
Now in its fourth edition, the Manual for Complex Litigation is
published by the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the
federal judiciary. The Manual is a virtual "how to" handbook for
the management of complex civil litigation, providing detailed
guidance on the supervision of all aspects of the pretrial and trial
phases of complicated actions. The Manual has been used
successfully in numerous cases to keep down discovery costs and
reduce unnecessary delay, proving that a willing court can
exercise meaningful control over claims and defenses asserted by
the parties and discovery.
In addition, the Court in Twombly failed to acknowledge
empirical studies that have found that in roughly fifty-percent of
the civil cases litigated in the federal system, there is minimal
discovery or no discovery at all.8 4 This oversight is significant.
The Twombly rationale is closely tied to concerns that defendants
in antitrust cases are at a decided disadvantage when
83 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 2004).
84 James S. Kakalik et. al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil
Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 621 (1998) (citing PAUL R.
CONNOLLY ET. AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS:
DISCOVERY 35 (1978)).
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minimalistic pleading allows plaintiffs with flimsy claims to
pursue broad pretrial discovery and thereby impose substantial
costs on defendants, leaving defendants with little choice but to
pay large sums to settle claims and buy peace.
That the Supreme Court seems so out of touch with the
judicial system that it is charged with managing is troublesome.
Even more troublesome is the Court's solution to the problems
that it identifies-dismissal of the claim at the pleading stage.
Query whether it makes good sense to invoke the drastic remedy
of dismissal at the point in the case where the plaintiff and the
court know the least about it. Dismissal is particularly harsh in
conspiracy cases when there is an asymmetry of information,
given that the defendant's conduct is typically covert and the
evidence of conspiracy is in the exclusive control of the
defendant. The Twombly ruling will mean that conspiracies,
already difficult enough to prove, will escape detection. Yet, the
Court makes no effort to address this inevitable result.
III. THE RESPONSE TO TWOMBLY
As a pronouncement of the nation's highest court, the
Twombly decision is the law of the land and remains so until the
Supreme Court overrules itself or Congress or the Advisory
Committee on Federal Civil Rules intervenes. The prospect of
the Supreme Court reconsidering Twombly in the near term is
remote and so, too, are the prospects for Congressional action.
The Supreme Court appears content to let lower courts struggle
with the implementation of Twombly, and Congress no doubt has
other fish to fry. The question, then, is whether the Advisory
Committee should intervene.
Now is an opportune time for the rulemakers to weigh in for
two reasons: (1) the uncertainty of the Twombly holding is
creating confusion in the lower courts; and (2) the time has come
systematically to reexamine notice pleading and determine
whether the current Rule 9(b) categories for particularity in
pleading should be expanded.
A. Uncertainty
As the Second Circuit has recognized, Twombly has created
"[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing
2008] 889
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the adequacy of pleadings."8 5 This uncertainty emanates from
several corners of the Circuit's decision. First, as discussed
above, while the rationale of the Twombly majority suggests that
the ruling be limited to complex cases involving "sprawling,
costly, and hugely time-consuming" discovery, the Court
articulates no such limits.8 6 The Second Circuit has held that
Twombly does not mandate a "universal standard of heightened
fact pleading."87 Other courts have taken a broader view of the
Twombly holding.88 It will take years to reach a consensus on
this issue.
Second, the Court itself seems to be inconsistent in its
application of the case. Two weeks after the Twombly ruling was
issued, the Court in Erickson v. Pardus8 9 upheld a pro se
complaint by a prisoner who claimed that he had suffered injury
by reason of the prison's wrongful termination of treatment for
his Hepatitis C. The trial court had dismissed the prisoner's
complaint on the grounds that he had failed to allege harm
caused by the discontinuance of treatment, as opposed to harm
from the disease itself.90 The Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that a pleader give fair notice of
the claim and grounds upon which it rests and that the plaintiff
had done so. 91 In addition, the Court criticized the Court of
Appeals' "departure from the liberal pleading standards set forth
by Rule 8(a)(2)" in a case involving a pro se party.92 Similarly,
the Court's seeming approval of skeletal allegations of negligence
in Official Form 9 in Twombly seems inconsistent with the
Twombly ruling.93
85 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76
U.S.L.W. 3499 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2008) (No. 07-1150).
86 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 n.6 (2007).
87 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157. Having come to that conclusion, however, the Second
Circuit provides little guidance as to when heightened fact pleading is appropriate.
The court enunciates a "flexible 'plausibility standard'" under which a pleader must
"amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such
amplification is needed to render a claim plausible." Id. at 157-58. In other words,
particularized pleading is not needed, except when it is needed.
88 See, e.g., Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663,
667-68 (7th Cir. 2007).
89 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam).
90 Id. at 2199.
91 Id. at 2200.
92 Id.
93 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1970 n.10 (2007).
[Vol. 82:877
TWOMBLY, THE RULES, AND THE COURTS
Third, a plausibility standard articulated in Twombly would
seem to be a low hurdle for the pleader. 94 Yet the Court
purported to enunciate a more demanding, as opposed to a less
demanding, pleading standard. The problem of uncertainty could
be addressed systematically and once and for all by the Advisory
Committee on Federal Rules. That approach seems preferable to
a case-by-case evaluation.
B. Revisiting Rule 8(a)(2)
Now that Twombly has overruled Conley v. Gibson, it is
imperative that the Advisory Committee revisit the pleading
standards under Rule 8. This is not to suggest that notice
pleading should be abandoned. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Erickson recognized the value of notice pleading. 95 Nevertheless,
the litigation landscape in federal court has changed significantly
since the Federal Rules were adopted. In 1938, big-case
litigation was virtually unknown in the federal system. It would
have been difficult for the rule makers in the 1930s to foresee the
cost burden imposed by discovery in the twenty-first century.
Now is an opportune time to consider whether pleading
requirements should be fine tuned to assure a level playing field.
It would seem that little change is needed in run-of-the-mill
cases, and the Supreme Court in Erickson acknowledged as
much.96  However, complex cases are another matter. The
Advisory Committee should consider adopting the following
principles.
1. Expanding the particularity in pleading requirement 97
to encompass cases generally viewed as complex. This
category would include antitrust, securities, RICO, and
environmental cases. It would also include mass
disaster cases, nationwide product liability suits, as well
as complex commercial litigation.
94 "Plausible" is defined as "superficially fair, reasonable or valuable, but often
specious ... superficially... persuasive.., appearing worthy of Belief." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 902 (9th ed. 1989).
95 See Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200.
96 See id.
97 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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2. If the complaint was found deficient, the preferred
remedy would be dismissal without prejudice.98 That is,
the plaintiff should be given a second shot at stating a
claim. This approach is fair to all sides. It assures that
a defendant will not incur costly discovery on a flimsy
claim, but, at the same time, gives the plaintiff one more
chance to stay in court. Nevertheless, the trial court
should retain discretion to dismiss those claims that
lack legal merit and cannot be resuscitated by any
amount of repleading.
3. Trial courts should be reluctant to dismiss cases prior to
discovery in situations when key information is in the
exclusive control of defendants. For example, in
antitrust conspiracy cases, when there is evidence of
parallel behavior but no smoking gun, plaintiffs should
be given some access to defendants' records before any
ruling on a motion to dismiss. The amount of access and
costs thereof would be governed by the proportionality
concept embedded in the Federal Rules.
CONCLUSION
Twombly has shifted the balance of power in federal court
decidedly in favor of defendants. The foregoing approach would
serve to balance the burdens and risks of federal civil litigation
and minimize the uncertainty created by the Twombly decision.
98 This is precisely the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Associated
General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519 (1983) wherein it stated:
Had the District Court required the Union to describe the nature of the
alleged coercion with particularity before ruling on the motion to dismiss, it
might well have been evident that no violation of law had been alleged. In
making the contrary assumption for purposes of our decision, we are
perhaps stretching the rule of Conley v. Gibson... too far. Certainly in a
case of this magnitude, a district court must retain the power to insist upon
some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual
controversy to proceed.
Id. at 528 n.17.
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